American University International Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 3

Article 1

1994

The Right to Habeas Corpus: Only in the Other
Americas
Elizabeth A. Faulkner

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Faulkner, Elizabeth A. "The Right to Habeas Corpus: Only in the Other Americas." American University International Law Review 9,
no. 3 (1994): 653-687.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

THE RIGHT TO HABEAS CORPUS:
ONLY IN THE OTHER AMERICAS*
"[N]o one can be perfectly free till all are free

..

Herbert Spencer, First Principles

Elizabeth A. Faulkner"
INTRODUCTION

Personal liberty is the most important fundamental human right? It
includes the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.2 The
writ of habeas corpus prevents legal authorities from wrongfully detaining individuals,3 thereby facilitating one of the basic guarantees of

*

Editor's note: In volume 10, The American University Journal of International

Law and Policy will publish a complete index to cases heard by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. Ms. Faulkner's article, and the cases cited herein,
should be read in light of this forthcoming publication.
** B.S. Northern Arizona University, 1986; J.D. Arizona State University, 1990.
Elizabeth Faulkner is an associate at Gust Rosenfeld in Phoenix, Arizona practicing in
civil litigation.
1. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the
right to be free from torture has become an accepted part of customary international
law); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (noting the surrender of
liberty interests upon curtailment of physical freedom by commitment, imprisonment,
or impairment of bodily integrity); see also Rodolfo Piza, Coordination of the Mechanisms for the Protection of Human Rights in the American Convention with those
Established by the United Nations, 30 AM. U. L REV. 167, 168-70 (1981) (discussing
the evolution of human rights in the international order).
2. Laurent Marcoux Jr., Protection from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention Under
International Law, 5 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. RE'V. 345 (1982); see Piza, supra note
1, at 168 (defining human rights as fundamental rights conferred upon an individual
and derived from an individual's human value and dignity).
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (5th ed. 1979) (defmiing a writ of habeas
corpus as a judicial order directing government officials to bring a person to custody
before a court for inquiry into the legality of the custody and to discharge the detainee if the custody is deemed invalid). Habeas corpus originally meant, in Latin, "you
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personal freedom in English and American law.4 A civilized society
cannot tolerate intrusions upon the right to remain free from detention
without due process of law.5
Abuses of basic human rights routinely occur in countries that do not
recognize the right to habeas corpus.6 Arbitrary arrests,, disappearances,
and torture occur regularly in many American countries.7 Worse, some

have the body." Iat
4. Marcoux, supra note 2, at 346. The concept of freedom from arbitrary arrest
and detention appeared in several early European documents, such as the Magna
Carta, the Habeas Corpus Acts of England, and the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and the Citizen. Id. The protections provided in these documents could not
be suspended. Id.at 347.
5. See Marcoux, supra note 2 at 347 (outlining the historical advances to ensure
against such intrusions). In 1679, England passed the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act.
Id. The Act provided that the Crown could not detain a prisoner against the wishes
of parliament and the courts. Id.Legal systems of democratic countries carried over
the concept Id. The English Statute of 31 Car. II, c. 2, created the original habeas
corpus act. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY, supra note 3, at 638.
In addition, each state in the United States has enacted similar statutes. Id.
Habeas corpus is regarded, generally, as the greatest constitutional guarantee of personal liberty. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (stating that the writ of habeas corpus shall
only be suspended in cases of rebellion, invasion or when the public safety requires
it); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993) (stating that for centuries the
writ of habeas corpus has offered the best defense guaranteeing personal freedom).
6. See, e.g., Human Rights in Guatemala During President Cerezo's First Year,
AMERIcAs WATCH, February, 1987, at 7-9 (discussing Guatemala's military dictatorships and describing their horrendous record of officially-sponsored murders of political opponents and "disappearances").
Although a full-time judge was assigned to the project, little progress was made
in investigating more than 1,400 writs of habeas corpus filed by the Grupo de Apoyo
Mutuo (the families of the disappeared). Id. at 8. Throughout 1986, the Guatemalan
press reported violent killings at a rate in excess of 100 per month. Id at 7. Abductions and disappearances have also increased. Id. Although identifying those responsible often proves difficult, in many cases, security forces are responsible. Id This is
supported by the condition of the bodies, often found with torture marks and bound
hands, the fact that certain victims were abducted and disappeared before their corpses
appeared, and the failure to investigate these crimes or bring to justice those responsible. Ia at 7-8.
7. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNFSTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1982, 106
(1982) (reporting that in 1981, the United Nations received reports of approximately
13,000 "disappearances" in 15 countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico). That same year, Amnesty International received numerous reports
of inhumane prison conditions and torture of political prisoners in Chile, Columbia, El
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governments consider violating the rights of dissidents both politically
and morally acceptable.8
In emergency situations, states face conflicting obligations.9 Although
a state must take steps to protect its very existence during national
emergencies, the state must still protect individual rights." Whether
securing the state's national interest or protecting the safety of its people, governments must reconcile individual and aggregate interests."
Reconciling these interests proves especially difficult during public emergencies.12
The historical record concerning human rights violations during states
of emergency is bleak.' 3 Disappearances, summary executions,
detentions without due process, torture, and other forms of cruel and
degrading treatment frequently accompany states of emergency. 4

Salvador, Guatemala. Haiti and other countries. I&
8. See id at 105-75 (discussing and detailing human rights violations made by
governments in the Americas during 1981).
9. M. McDOUGAL, Er AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUB11C ORDER 413-14
(1980).

10. Id at 414-15.
11. Id at 413-15.
12. Id A state of emergency occurs during an extraordinary national crisis and
generally entails broad restrictions on human rights. See generally EDWARD LAWSO.%;,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHrS 1406-10 (1991) (outlining the various international
conventions that define and govern when and what actions a state may take in time
of crisis). In theory, the restrictions are limited in time; once the crisis is resolved.
full recognition of human rights returns. See, e.g., id at 1407 (citing the Human
Rights Committee's general comments on article 4 in the International Convention on
Human Rights, which state the committee's contention that measures taken under the
article 4, public emergency provisions, should be considered "exceptional and temporary in nature" and that they should only continue for the period in which "the life
of the nation concerned is threatened"). In a conflict between national survival and
strict enforcement of human rights, international law supports national survival. INT'L
COMM'N OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THER IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTs 438
(1983). The recent exception to this premise came in the Habeas Corpus Case, which
promises a new respect for human rights. See infra notes 102-37 and accompanying
text (explaining the Habeas Corpus Case and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights' analysis of the state of emergency provisions in the American Convention on
Human Rights).
13. MCDOUGAL, supra note 9, at 413-15.
14. See AMqEST INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGrIES 11 (1984) (discussing the prevalence of torture and human rights violations). Torture most often occurs
during a detainee's first days in custody. Id These vulnerable hours are usually spent
incommunicado, when security forces maintain total control over the fate of the detainee, denying access to relatives, lawyers or independent doctors. Id Some detainees
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Worse, some governments invoke national security to justify restricting
individual rights.' 5 Because national security is often emotive and politically charged, governments can easily manipulate public opinion by
6
selectively releasing information and appealing to mass fears.'

are held in secret, their whereabouts known only to their captors. Id. Authorities often
deny that certain detainees are held, making it easier to torture or kill them or to
make them "disappear." Id Incommunicado detention, secret detention and "disappearances" increase the latitude of security agents over the lives and well-being of the
people in custody. Id Suspension of habeas corpus and other legal remedies, trial of
political detainees in military courts and the lack of any independent means to examine or record a prisoner's medical condition allow security forces to conceal evidence
of torture from lawyers, civilian magistrates, independent doctors and others who
would be capable of taking action against their illegal activities. Id.
15. See generally MCDOUGAL, supra note 9, at 413-15 (stating that claimed
threats to national security vary). External attacks, subversion, internal unrest, violence,
and economic crisis are commonly cited menaces. Id Sometimes governments claim
multiple threats of a highly diffused nature or even claim wholesale suspension of the
constitutional order to justify restricting the rights and freedoms of citizens. Id
16. See ARGENTINA NATIONAL COMMISSION OF DISAPPEARED PEOPLE, NUNcA
MAS 51-52 (Writer's and Scholars International Ltd., trans., 1st ed. 1986) (noting that
Argentina continually denies disappearances and tortures and restricts their dissemination to the world through secret detention centers). Approximately 340 secret detention
centers have for years illegally deprived thousands of persons of their freedom. Id.
Some of the detainees have never returned. Id Military authorities respond to national
and international public opinion by asserting that the missing persons were abroad or
that they fell victim to feuding among themselves. Id at 52. The military government
also uses its total control of the media to confuse and misinform the public. Id
States of emergency have profound negative effects on national political systems. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 12, at 413-17. During states of emergency, governments often eliminate educational and artistic pluralism, and restrict the
ability to distribute and receive information, Id at 417-20. These restrictions limit
political freedom and unionization and impede the accommodation and integration of
diverse social groups in national polity. Id. at 417-24. For example, during the summer of 1993, the Guatemalan government elected no less than 5 different presidents.
During the political changes, the government-elect ordered all media to cease dissemination of any election news. In compliance, a Guatemalan newspaper published only
solid black pages.
Further, the search for political solutions through negotiation and consensus may
give way to reliance on the military for settling disputes with opposing groups. Id at
417-24. States of emergency often provide a means through which ruling minorities
safeguard their own power by instituting permanent restrictions of human rights. Id. at
415-16.
During states of emergency, persons in the government attracted to the exercise
of total power often emerge; the population becomes frightened and resentful. Id at
417-24. Ironically, the very same emergency powers originally invoked to save the
nation and continue its existence as an organized community become the vehicle for
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Modem constitutions and international human rights instruments rec-

ognize governmental restrictions on personal freedoms as a necessary
response to a genuine threat to national security. 7 Although countries
do face genuine threats to their security, national security concerns are
most often invoked to legitimize restrictions on personal freedoms, fre-

quently exaggerating or concocting the danger and taking excessive or
unwarranted restrictive measures.' 8 Government power elites often invoke national security to further personal ends.' 9 Although the international community does not offer absolute safeguards to human rights, it
must guard against spurious invocations of community interests to excuse human rights violations.20

The international community must recognize the inherent limits of
subordinating constitutional liberties in an otherwise one-sided focus on
meeting threats to national security.2 ' Individual rights also rate as soci-

repressing the nation, and in the end, the nation must be saved from its own saviors.
Id Thus, the increased concentration of governmental power, along with the destruction of societal checks and balances, creates and perpetuates entrenched authoritarian
systems. Id
17. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, OEA/ser. K/XVYI.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 O.A.S.T.S., No.
36 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention] (governing restrictions on personal freedoms); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 15, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention] (discussing the allowance of
restrictions on personal freedom during times of national emergency).
18. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 330 (1946) (Murphy J.. concurring) (recognizing that throughout history oppressors have used real or imagined
threats to the public well-being as an excuse for abrogating human rights in an unwarranted manner). Unfortunately, the practice that Justice Murphy decried has continued unabated since that time for a large portion of the human population.
19. MCDOUGAL, supra note 9, at 805.
20. Christopher Schreuer, Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public
Emergency: The Experience of the European Convention on Human Rights, 9 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORDER 113 (1982).

21. See L.C. Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situations, 16
CAN. Y.B. INT'L LAw 92, 97-115 (1978) (stating that international documents recognize the need to accomplish both sets of goals by allowing partial or complete suspension of certain rights during states of emergencies).
One commentator asserts that the policy underlying these provisions focuses on
an attempt to limit noncompliance in order to prevent the need for more far-reaching
limitations of human rights. Schreuer, supra note 20, at 115. Professor Schreuer explains that without such a safety valve, states might hesitate to join the Convention or
might append more significant reservations to their accession. IdL Moreover, during an
actual emergency, such as war, civil unrest, or revolution, national elites may consider

658

AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y

[VOL. 9:3

etal rights, and therefore, merge as an integral part of any democratic
society. Thus, a democratic society that sacrifices individual rights to
protect itself may find that it no longer safeguards the rights upon
which it was founded. 22
The declaration of a state of emergency often serves as a harbinger of
serious human rights violations5 Law can and must ensure individual
rights for all, at all times?2 Recognizing the right of freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, a number of international treaties have established guidelines regulating emergency situations.25 Recently, the

compliance a low priority and may resort to broader claims to derogate their obligations, or they may even denounce the Convention entirely. Id. Derogation clauses,
therefore, may offer advantages if limited in scope, applied in accordance with the
basic purpose of the Convention, and if they follow basic democratic policies. Id at
115-16.
22. See Thomas Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, 9 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORDER 78, 80 (1982). Despite its potentially adverse effects on the
world public order, national security constitutes an unavoidable sub-category of both
strategy and politics. Id, at 79. No government stands free to determine independently
what its security needs are and, therefore, how much of its resources it should divert
for security purposes. Id. at 81-82. The practical importance of national security compels the search for an approach that makes security goals compatible with democratic
values and human rights. See id at 111 (asserting that a firmly guarded national
security system that seeks to deter all risks is "not compatible with a democratic
society," calling for accommodation between the systems of national security and
safeguarding constitutional liberty through the judicial system).
23. See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866) (stating that
"[bjy the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection,
and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers").
24. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, TEE DIPLOMATIC PROTECrION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD 14 (1915) (explaining the obligations of states and their neighbors to ensure
the protection of human rights on a continual basis).
[Wihere a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its
own citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other
states of the family nation are authorized by international law to intervene on
grounds of humanity. When these 'human' rights are habitually violated, one or
more states may intervene in the name of the society of nations and may take
such measures as to substitute at least temporarily, if not permanently, its own
sovereignty for that of the state thus controlled. Whatever the origin, therefore,
of the rights of the individual, it seems assured that these essential rights rest
upon the ultimate sanction of international law, and will be protected, in last
resort, by the most appropriate organ of the international community.
Id. (footnote omitted).
25. See generally LAWSON, supra note 12, at 1406-10 (providing selected portions
of international treaties governing human rights treatment during states of emergency).
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the right to habeas
corpus is nonderogable, even during states of emergency.'
This Comment discusses the role of the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention)T in protecting human rights
within the American hemisphere and compares it to the European system for protecting human rights.2 Section I surveys the Inter-American
system for protecting human rights and the American Convention. Section II analyzes the Inter-American Court's Habeas Corpus advisory
opinion.2 Section III examines the development and current status of
the European system for protecting human rights. Section IV discusses
the implications of the Habeas Corpus Court's opinion for the protection
against arbitrary arrest and detention in the Americas and in Europe.
Section V offers recommendations for more effective protection of human rights. Finally, this Comment concludes that the United States and
Western Europe must comply with the Habeas Corpus Case and declare
habeas corpus as a nonderogable right in all circumstances.
I. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the American
Convention in 1969 to protect human rights through a judicial forumI

26. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2). 25(l) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion, OC-8/87 of Jan. 30, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct H.R., Series A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 8 (1987) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus Case].
27. American Convention, supra note 17. As the regional treaty for the western
hemisphere, the American Convention provides a legal framework for states of emergency in the Americas and regulates the assertion of emergency powers by any state
a party to it See JAIME ORAA, HUNMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 51-55 (1992) (discussing the role of the American Convention in
monitoring human rights practices during states of emergency).
28. See infra notes 138-204 and accompanying text (explaining the European
mechanisms governing human rights).
29. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26; see infra notes 102-37 and accompany-

ing text (discussing the Inter-American Court's analysis in the Habeas Corpus Case).
30. Comment, "Other Treaties": 77w Inter-American Court of Human Rights Defines Its Advisory Jurisdiction,33 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 221-12 (1983). Organized for
commercial purposes in 1890, the OAS originated as the International Union of American Republics. FREDERICK L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR
LEGAL SETrING, SELECrED DOCuENTS 9 (1993). The organization changed its name
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Since its entry into force in 1978, twenty-three out of thirty-one OAS
member states have ratified the American Convention.3' The United
States, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay are among the nations who have not
yet ratified the American Convention.32 Containing two substantive
parts, the American Convention is modelled on the European Convention
on Human Rights and envisions a similar institutional structure.33 Part I
of the American Convention establishes the duties of the signatory
states,3 defines the protected rights,35 and provides the means for the

to the Pan American Union in 1912. Id. The OAS, as it presently exists, emerged in
1948. Id. The OAS Charter designated organs to implement programs relating to dispute resolution and defense, as well as social, cultural and economic development.
Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 3, 119 U.N.T.S.
3, T.I.A.S. No 2361, amended effective 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
31. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & ROBERT E. NORRIS, 5 HuMAN RIGTS-ThE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM app. 5 at 3 (1993). The American Convention on Human
Rights was opened for signature on November 22, 1969 at an Inter-American Specialized Conference, held in San Josd, Costa Rica, under the auspices of the OAS. Id. It
became effective on July 18, 1978, and has been ratified by 23 OAS Member States.
See id (indicating that Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay, and Venezuela all ratified the American Convention).
32. fId The United States signed the Convention and President Jimmy Carter referred it to the Senate for its advice and consent. President's Message to the Senate
Transmitting Human Rights Treaties, I PRES. PAPERS 395 (1978). President Carter
signed three major human rights treaties during his first year in office. Id. He signed
the American Convention, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id.
A year later, in 1978, President Carter transmitted these instruments, together with the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination, to the
Senate for its advice and consent. Id. In 1979, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held extensive hearings on these treaties. International Human Rights Treaties:
Hearings on Ex. C, D, E, and F, 95-2--Four Treaties Relating to Human Rights Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
To date, the Senate has not taken any further action regarding these treaties
and the United States has not ratified them. But see, State Department's Human
Rights Report: Organizations and Human Rights Subcomm. of the House Foreign
Affairs Comm., 103 Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (discussing the Clinton Administration's
support for ratification of these four treaties).
33. See Thomas Buergenthal, American Convention on Human Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 131, 132 (R. Bernhardt, ed. 1992) (explaining the drafting history of the American Convention and indicating that it relied
heavily on the European Convention).
34. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 1-2.
35. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 3-26.
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suspension of certain rights.36 Part II establishes two autonomous organizations: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the Commission)f and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the
Court).3 8 Together these organizations comprise the Convention's enforcement mechanism. 39 To protect human rights within the Inter-American system, the Commission investigates and attempts to settle alleged

violations of the American Convention. 40 The Court interprets the
American Convention and tries complaints that the Commission is unable to settle'
Only the Commission and member states accepting the Court's jurisdiction have standing to bring cases. 4' Although individuals lack standing to bring cases before the Court, the Commission may refer individual complaints to the Court 3 The American Convention requires the
Commission to appear in all cases it refers to the Court." Additionally,
the Commission may request advisory opinions from the Court!4
B. THE GUARANTEES OF THE AmmERCAN CONVENIrON
The American Convention guarantees more than two dozen broad

categories of civil and political rights.' 6 The guarantees include the

36. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 27-30.
37. American Convention, supra note 17. art. 33. The American Convention mandates that the Commission protect human rights. Id art. 41. The Commission principally deals with charges of violations of the rights the Convention guarantees. Id arts.
41(f), 44-51. The American Convention acknowledges the right of individual petition
while it provides the right of inter-state communications in a limited manner. Id arts.
44-45.
38. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 5239. See American Convention, supra note 17, art. 33-82 (delegating authority to
the Commission and the Court); see id art 41 (listing the Commission's functions and
powers); id. art. 57 (requiring the inclusion of the Commission in all cases before the
Court); i. art. 61 (explaining the Court's jurisdiction).
40. See American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 41-82 (listing the
Commission's functions).
41. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 62-64.
42. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 61.
43. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 44.
44. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 57, 61.
45. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 64.
46. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 3-26.
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right to judicial personality, 47 the right to life, 48 the right to humane
treatment,4 9 the right to be free from slavery,50 the right to personal
liberty,51 the right to a fair trial,52 the right to equal protection of the
law,53 and the right to judicial protection. 54 The American Convention
obligates parties to respect and ensure the free and full exercise of the

Convention's rights and guarantees.55 The parties agree to take progressive measures to fully realize the rights implicit in the economic, scien-

tific, and cultural standards set forth in the American Convention.56 The
American Convention also imposes a broad nondiscrimination clause.57

47. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 3 The American Convention guarantees the right to be recognized as a person before the law. l
48. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 4.
49. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 5.
50. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 6.
51. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 7.
52. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 8.
53. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 24.
54. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 25.
55. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 1(1). Under the American Convention, rights do not extend to corporations. See idL art. 1(2) (stipulating that "person"
means human being).
56. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 26.
57. American Convention, supra note 17, art.l(1).
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C. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Court,58 like other international tribunals,59 has two kinds of jurisdiction: adjudicatory and advisory. 60 Adjudicatory jurisdiction autho-

rizes the Court to decide cases in which the complaining party alleges
that a state has violated rights guaranteed by the American Convention.61

A state does not accept contentious jurisdiction by merely ratify-

ing the American Convention.62 Contentious jurisdiction is optional.

Parties must accept jurisdiction before they may file cases or have
standing to appear in cases brought against them.6

As soon as a state

ratifies the American Convention, the Commission has jurisdiction to

hear an individual petition directed against that state.6 The Court's
judgment in a contentious case is binding upon the parties.'6
The American Convention grants the Court the broadest possible advisory jurisdiction of any international tribunal.6 The Court's advisory

58. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 52-69. See Thomas Buergenthal,
The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Similarities and Differences, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 155, 157 (1981) (explaining the composition of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights). The Convention established the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in 1978. LAWSON, supra note 12, at 906. The Court consists
of seven judges, nominated and elected by the parties to the American Convention.
American Convention, supra note 17, art. 52. Judges serve a six-year term and may
be elected again for only one additional term. Id. art. 54. The Court has its seat in
San Jos6, Costa Rica. LAWSON, supra note 12, at 906.
59. See, e.g., H.W.A. Thirlway, Advisory Opinions of International Courts, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBuC INTERNATiONAL LAW 38-43 (R. Bernhardt, ed. 1992) (explaining the function of an advisory opinion and the jurisdiction of the various international courts, including the Permanent Court of International Justice, the European Court
of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to give advisory
opinions); see also Pierre Pescatore, Court of Justice of the European Communities, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 852, 855-60 (R. Bernhardt. ed. 1992)
(discussing the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities).
60. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 62-64.
61. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 62(3).
62. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 62. The American Convention de-

lineates the Court's contentious jurisdiction. It
63. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 61.

64. American Convention, supra note 17, arts. 44-45.
65. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 62(1).
66. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 64; Thomas Buergenthal, The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L 231 (1982). Compare Protocol
II to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, May 6, 1963, art. 1(2), reprinted in COUNcIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CON-
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jurisdiction authorizes it to issue legal opinions even though no controversy exists between parties.0 All OAS members or organs, regardless
of whether they have ratified the Convention, may invoke the Court's
advisory jurisdiction."
Although nonbinding, international courts utilize advisory opinions as

an important and useful tools.69 Advisory opinions enable courts to interpret applicable law before disputes occur and therefore may help to
prevent conflicts. 0 The Court's pronouncements are respected as legal
authority because of the Court's character as a judicial institution empowered to interpret and apply the American Convention. 71 Thus,
whether such a pronouncement is made as an advisory opinion or in a
contentious
case does not effect its legitimacy or authoritative charac72
ter.
The American Convention does not establish a formal procedure to

enforce the Court's rulings against recalcitrant states. 73 The Convention,
however, allows the OAS to convene a special session or to take other
measures the OAS deems appropriate. 74
D.

ARTICLE

27, THE DEROGATION CLAUSE

Article 27 of the American Convention permits the suspension of

certain rights only during wartime or other emergency situations which
threaten state independence or security.75 This clause is similar to Arti-

cle 15 of the European Convention, which allows for derogations from

ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECrED TXrs 120 (1978) (discussing the advisory
power of the European Court of Human Rights).
67. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 64.
68. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 64.
69. See Comment, supra note 30, 217-20; see also Thomas Buergenthal, The
Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1985) (analyzing the Inter-American Court's exercise of advisory jurisdiction).
70. Comment, supra note 30, at 217.
71. See H.W.A. Thirlway, supra note 59, at 38 (explaining that international tribunals do not inherently have the power to give advisory opinions unless that power
is conferred upon the tribunal by its creating instrument or convention).
72. See H.W.A. Thirlway, supra note 59, at 42 (noting "the solemnity of the
[c]ourt's decision in advisory cases" and "its close formal resemblance to a
judgement").
73. See American Convention, supra note 17, art. 68(1) (mandating that parties to
the Convention comply with the Court's judgments).
74. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 65.
75. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27.
VENTION
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human rights obligations "[i]n times of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation. '76 Although the derogation clauses
are similar, the legislative history of Article 27 and the catalog of
nonderogable rights demonstrates that the American Convention provides
more protection of human rights than does the European Convention.
1. Legislative History

Three drafts of the American Convention preceded the current version! 7 Dissatisfied with these drafts, the Commission devised the

working document for the Conference of San Jos6. 8 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights served as a model for the working draft7 Initially, the working draft permitted the suspension of hu-

76. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
77. See Comparative Study of the Draft Convention on Human Rights Prepared
by the Inter-American Council of Jurists (Approved At Its Fourth Meeting, Santiago,
Chile, 1959) And Those Presented by Uruguay and Cidle At the Second Special InterAmerican Conference (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), OEA/Serv LJV/ll. 14 Doc. 7 (English)
Corr. (1966) (comparing the American Convention drafts submitted by Chile, Uruguay
and the Inter-American Council of Jurists). The Inter-American Council of Jurists and
the Uruguayan government composed two drafts. ld.These drafts permitted derogation
during officially proclaimed public emergencies. d at 26-27. Additionally, the Uruguayan version required competent state authorities to declare a public emergency. Id.
at 28. The Chilean government created the third draft. Id. at 27-28. The Chilean draft
adopted the same language as the IACJ and Uruguayan versions providing for derogations in limited circumstances recognized by law. Id. According to these drafts, as
long as the member states are recognized by law in their respective states, they could
adopt dispositions that for a limited time and in necessary strict measures, allowed
them to derogate human rights. Id; Acta Resumida de la Cuarta Sesidn, reprinted in,
Segunda Conferencia Interamericana Extraordinaria, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Nov. 17-30,
1965, I ACrAS Y DOCUMENTOS, OEA/Ser. E/XIU 3, Doc. 118, at 432, 440 (1965).
78. Robert E. Norris & Paula Desio Reiton, The Suspension of Guarantees: A
Comparative Analysis of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Constitutions of the States Parties, 30 AM. U. L REV. 189, 191-92 (1981). The Commission expressed dissatisfaction with the suggested derogation clauses. Opinion Prepared
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Draft Convention on
Human Rights Approved by the Inter-American Council of Jurists at its Fourth Meeting, Santiago, Chile 1959, OEAISer. LJV/II.15, Doec. 26, at 13 (1966). The Commission recommended that the OAS consider a report prepared by one of its members.
Id. The special report concluded that only war or other public emergency that
threatened national security justifies the derogation of human rights. Report on the
Work Accomplished During its Eighteenth Session April 1-17, 1968, OEA/Ser.
LJV/IL19, Doc. 30, at 45 (1968).
79. Norris & Reiton, supra note 78, at 192.
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man rights during official public emergencies. 0
The Commission later dropped this language and revised Article 27 in
accordance with its earlier resolution on the protection of human
rights. 8' The final version allowed derogation from guarantees "[i]n
time of war or other emergency
which threatens the independence or the
82
Party"
State
a
of
security
The study upon which the final resolution and article were founded
emphasized that human rights should be suspended only in truly exceptional circumstances that threaten state security. 3 A state may resort to
emergency powers only when other means of maintaining peace have
failed. 84 The Commission's final draft included due process of law, as
well as the right to protection from arbitrary arrest and detention in its
list of nonderogable rights. 5 Due to86 dissension among the delegations,
the new version deleted both rights.
The United States delegation's motion to reincorporate these rights
was defeated." The United States successfully proposed an amendment
to the derogation article, creating the clause: "or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights."'8 This amendment became the springboard for the Habeas Corpus Case, which recognizes
that a right is not fully protected unless governmental actions or laws
restricting that right can be challenged for their constitutional or legal
propriety.

80. Working Draft of the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights, art. 19,
1, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.19, Doc. 36, at 14 (1968).
81. See Report of the Work Accomplished During its Nineteenth Session (Special)
July 1-11, 1968, OEA/Ser. L/V/lI.19, Doc. 51 (1969) (discussing the final language of
the derogation clause).
82. Id at 50.
83. Daniel Hugo Martins, The Protection of Human Rights in Connection with
the Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees or "State of Siege", OEA/Ser. LJV/I.15,
Doc. 12 (English) at 34-35 (1967). The study concluded that human rights should be
suspended only to protect state security. Id. at 34.
84. See id (explaining that human rights should be suspended only in emergency
situations).
85. Annotations on the Draft Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human
Rights, Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San Jose, Costa
Rica, 1969, OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 12, at 30-33 (1969).
86. Id at 264-66.
87. Id at 267.
88. Id at 448.
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2. Limitations on the Scope of the Suspension

A party may derogate from its obligation to respect the rights
guaranteed in the American Convention only "to the extent and for the
period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation .... , The extent of the derogation may be restricted by limiting
the territory affected or the measures taken." Additionally, the

American Convention contains an arbitrary arrest provision further limiting the measures that a state may employ and compelling a narrow
interpretation of circumstances permitting derogation. 9'
Moreover, under the American Convention each person's rights are
limited by the rights of others, and by the security and general welfare
of all, which form important components of a democratic society. Of
the three comparable human rights instruments, only the American Con-

vention contains such a general restrictive clause.93 This provision demonstrates that states should not resort to derogation in ordinary situations, but only in extraordinary situations in which ordinary measures
prove insufficient.9
89. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(l).
90. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(1).
91. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 7.
Article 7 reads in part:
1. Everyone has the right to personal liberty and security.
2. No one shall be deprived of his personal liberty except for the reasons and
under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State
Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.
3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.
Id)
92. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 32(2). See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969. art. 31. J 1. g I.L.M. 679
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (setting forth the basic rule of interpretation for treaties applicable to the American and European Conventions); see also id. art. 32 (providing that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in the context and in the light of its
object and purpose").
93. Cf European Convention. supra note 17, and International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter International Covenant] (permitting derogation from guaranteed rights under
less compelling circumstances).
94. See Report of the European Commission on Human Rights, Lawless Case
(Lawless v. Ireland), 1960-61 E.C.H.R., ser. B. at 91 (opinion of Mr. Eustathiades)
[hereinafter Report on the Lawless Case] (distinguishing the gravity of the situation
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The Convention also limits measures that states may take in emergency situations by requiring that they not create measures inconsistent with
other commitments under international law. 95 Consequently, any derogation must not violate other treaties to which that state is also a party.
3. Nonderogable Guarantees
The derogation clause of the American Convention does not authorize
the suspension of all rights.96 Nonsuspendable rights include rights to
judicial personality, life, humane treatment, name, nationality, and participation in government' The rights of family and of child, freedom of
conscience and religion, and freedom from slavery and ex post facto
laws are also not suspendable. 8
The American Convention further prohibits suspension of the "judicial
guarantees essential for the protection" of nonderogable rights.99 Al-

though the Convention does not specify the "essential" guarantees, the
Habeas Corpus Case indicates one right which is considered essential-the right to a judicial hearing before a judicial officer.' ° Upholding the right to habeas corpus is essential because it offers the only
method of enforcing the Convention's remaining rights.'0 '

II. THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE
A. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 7,25, 27
Because of the atrocities that often accompany states of emergency,
the Commission requested that the Court interpret the scope of the last
phrase of Article 27'0° which prohibits the suspension of judicial guarreferred to in Article 15 of the European Convention).
95. See American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(1) (limiting allowable dero-

gations to those measures consistent with other international treaty obligations). Humanitarian law agreements are deemed incorporated by reference to the derogation
clause of the American Convention for those parties that have also ratified the Geneva Conventions and the Two Protocols. l Any derogations inconsistent with the
humanitarian law conventions are not permitted. IkL
96. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
97. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
98. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
99. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
100. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
101. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
102. See American Convention, supra note 17, art. 64(1) (granting the Commission
the right to seek an advisory opinion through an "interpretation of [the American]
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antees necessary for the protection of certain nonderogable rights.,
The Commission suggested that the value of the right to habeas corpus
is greatest during states of emergency. ' ° The immediate goal of habeas corpus is to bring the detainee before a judge to verify that he is
alive and to determine whether his captors subjected him to physical or
psychological torture'O5 The Commission reasoned that the right to habeas corpus constitutes an inextricable part of the right to humane
treatment, which is never suspendable.'O' In fact, without habeas corpus, the right to humane treatment cannot be enforced." The Court issued a unanimous opinion supporting the Commission's view.' s

Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the
American States"). The Commission is additionally empowered with an absolute right
to request advisory opinions within the framework of Article 64(1). The Effect of
Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights
(Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, Series A. No. 2,
16.
103. See Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26. at 515 (interpreting the scope of
Article 27). In its request for an opinion, the Commission argued that some parties
assume that the writ of habeas corpus is suspendable. I4 Some states promulgated
special laws and instituted certain practices enabling them in some cases to hold a
detainee incommunicado for up to 15 days. Id The Commission stated that the detainee is often secluded from any outside contact and is prevented from resorting to
the writ of habeas corpus at a time of its greatest importance. I&
104. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 515.
105. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26. at 515.

106. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 5. Article 5 provides:
Right to Humane Treatment:
1. Every person shall have the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
integrity respected.
2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal.
4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from
convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their
status as unconvicted persons.
5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults
and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they
may be treated in accordance with their status as minors.
6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential
aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners.
d
107. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 514.
108. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26. at 523.
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In interpreting Articles 25(1) and 7(6) of the American Convention,
the Court considered the rules of treaty interpretation set out in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the provisions of Article
29 of the American Convention.' 9 The Vienna Convention eschews a
detailed collection of treaty interpretation cannons. The Vienna Convention contains two basic principles: (1) treaties are binding and require a
good faith performance,"0 and (2) a party may not invoke domestic
law to justify failure to perform a treaty."'
The Court in the Habeas Corpus Case first noted that Article 27 does
not address whether the right of habeas corpus is nonderogable."'
When read in conjunction with the specific category of "judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights," the Court concluded that
suspension of guarantees does not imply a temporary suspension of the
rule of law." 3 Nor does the suspension of guarantees mean that those
in power may disregard the principle of legality, which is always
binding." 4 An inseparable bond exists between the principle of legality, democratic institutions, and the rule of law." 5

109. See Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 31(1) (stating that "[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and

purpose").
Article 29 of the American Convention provides:
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict
them to a greater extent than is provided for herein;
b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by
virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party;
c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or
d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.
American Convention, supra note 17, art. 29
The Court interpreted Article 27(2) as preventing suppression of the rights and freedoms recognized in the American Convention. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at
516.
110. See Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 26 (describing the treaty principle
known as the pacta sunt servanda).
111. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 27.
112. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 517.
113. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 517.
114. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 517.
115. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 519; see also American Convention,
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Moreover, the Court reasoned that because guarantees are designed to
protect and ensure the exercise of a right, parties to the American Convention have an obligation to respect the rights of all persons, as well6
as an obligation to protect and ensure the exercise of such rights.'1
The Court then pointed out that the Article 27 derogation provision
itself is subject to certain limitations; it applies only in war time, public
danger or states of emergency which threaten the continued existence or
well-being of the state. 1 7 The Court further noted that the provision

permits suspension of certain rights and freedoms "only to the extent
and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation;" such measures must not violate the party's other international
legal obligations. Further, the measures must not involve "discrimination
on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origi."118

The Court observed that abuses often result from the application of
emergency measures not objectively justified." 9 Given the principles
upon which the Inter-American system is founded, the suspension of
guarantees not only undermines the foundation of democracy, but calls
the continued protection of certain fundamental human
into question
12°
rights.
B. Tim COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF "JUDICIAL GuARANTEES
ESSENTIAL FOR THE PROTECTION OF SUCH RIGHTS"

After the Court limited the boundaries of a party's power to curtail
certain rights during emergency situations, it determined which rights
fall within the scope of the derogation provision.'12 When determining
what judicial remedies are "essential" to protect nonsuspendable rights,
supra note 17, art. 30 (limiting derogation of protected rights and freedoms to measures that are in accord with public law and the general interest of the community).
116. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26. at 518. The Court stated that "[t]he

concept of rights and freedoms as well as that of their guarantees cannot be divorced
from the system of values and principles that inspire it. In a democratic society, the
rights and freedoms inherent in the human person, the guarantees applicable to them
and the rule of law form a triad." Id; see also American Convention. supra note 17,
art. 1(1) (creating an obligation for all member parties to respect the rights enumerated in the Convention).
117. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Habeas
Habeas
Habeas
Habeas

Corpus
Corpus
Corpus
Corpus

Case,
Case,
Case,
Case,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

26,
26,
26,
26,

at
at
at
at

518.
518.
518.
518.
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the answer varies depending upon which rights are at stake." 2 Some
human rights cannot be outweighed by any exigent circumstances."
For example, the Court recognized that the "essential" judicial guarantees necessary to protect a person's physical integrity differs from rights
that seek to protect the right to a name.'2
In analyzing "essential" judicial guarantees, the Court defined "judicial" to refer only to those remedies capable of protecting rights.'21
The Court found implicit in this definition "the active involvement of an
independent and impartial judicial body having the power to pass on the
lawfulness of measures adopted in a state of emergency."'

In deter-

mining that the right to habeas corpus is an essential judicial guarantee,
the Court looked to Article 25(1) of the American Convention, which
provides that all individuals have the right to immediate judicial review
of all possible acts that violate fundamental rights afforded by the Convention."

The Court termed the general provision in Article 25(1) as "amparo,"
a simple and prompt remedy designed to protect all rights under the
Convention.1 2 The Court reasoned that "amparo" applies to all rights,
including those nonderogable rights expressly mentioned in Article
27(2)."2 The Court determined that the writ of habeas corpus constitutes a judicial remedy designed to protect against arbitrary arrest and
detention through a judicial decree ordering the appearance of the detained person before a judge to determine the lawfulness of the deten-

122. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 518.
123. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 518. This author believes that some
human rights are fundamental rights-fundamental in the sense that they are conferred
upon the individual as such and solely for his human condition, in such a way that
they are derived from his own human nature, from his intrinsic dignity; and that they
are, as such, antecedent to, superior to, and independent of any authority and, therefore, cannot be invented, but merely discovered.
124. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 519-21.
125. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 520.
126. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 520.
127. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 25 (1). Article 25(1) reads in part:
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse . . . to a competent
court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized . . . by this Convention, even though such persons acting in the
course of their official duties.
Id.
128. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 520.
129. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 520.
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tion and, if appropriate, to order the release of the detainee.""
"Amparo" comprises a whole series of remedies, and habeas corpus
provides an essential component of "amparo" as well as an independent
remedy.13' For habeas corpus to achieve its primary purpose, the detained person must appear before a competent judge or tribunal. Habeas
corpus plays an important role in ensuring respect for a person's life
and physical integrity, in preventing his disappearance, and in protecting
him against torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. m
Applying this reasoning to the practices of certain nations in the western
hemisphere, the Court concluded that the rights to life and humane
treatment are threatened whenever habeas corpus is suspended.'33
Given the Inter-American system's deep-rooted principles, the suspension of guarantees must remain associated with the "effective exercise of
representative democracy" referred to in Article 3 of the OAS Charter.'34 The Court held that, because habeas corpus forms a judicial
guarantee essential to protect the rights and freedoms of a democratic
society, Article 27(2) prohibits its suspension."

130. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 520.
131. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 521.
132. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 521.
133. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 521.
134. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 518; OAS Charter, supra note 30.
art. 3.
135. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 518. The Court ruled that the writ of
habeas corpus is non-suspendable. Id Although many provisions of the American
Convention do not recognize habeas corpus as a nonderogable right in emergency
situations, the Court relied on Article 27(2) for its authority that such a right is nonsuspendable. l
The Court found support for its conclusion that the right to habeas corpus was
an essential judicial guarantee by referring to the record of the Commission's address
during the hearing on the request for this advisory opinion. Id The President of the
Commission stated in the hearing:
The Commission is convinced that thousands of forced disappearances could
have been avoided in the recent past if the writ of habeas corpus had been
effective and if the judges had investigated the detention by personally going to
the places that had been denounced as those of detention. This writ is the best
instrument available to correct promptly abuses of authority involving arbitrary
deprivation of freedom. It is also an effective means of preventing torture and
other physical and psychological abuses, such as exile, perhaps the worst punishment, which has been so abused in our hemisphere, where thousands of
exiles make up a true exodus.
As the Commission has painfully recalled in its last Annual Report, these
tortures and constraints tend to occur during long periods of incommunication,
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The Court in the Habeas Corpus Case thus derived its interpretation

of Article 27(2), as applied to Article 7(6) and in light of Article 25(1),
by examining not only the ordinary meaning of the articles, but the
realities of the subsequent practice of parties under the Convention.'6
The Court found no reason to exclude the right of habeas corpus from

the Convention's protection and thereby upheld habeas corpus as an
"essential judicial guarantee" of the remaining rights and freedoms. 3 7
III. THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights, established in 1959, is the

most judicially active of the international human rights tribunals. The
Council of Europe (the Council), a regional intergovernmental organization consisting of twenty-one western European nations, established the
European System for protecting human rights.

8

The Council's legal

authority to protect and promote human rights emanates from two treaties: the European Convention of Human Rights (the European Convention) and the European Social Charter (the Charter).'39 The European
Court's jurisdiction extends to the interpretation and application of the
European Convention and its various Additional Protocols. 4 ' The Eu-

ropean Convention, entered into force in 1953, guarantees basic civil
and political rights, while the Charter guarantees economic and social
rights.' 4 ' Article 3 of the European Convention serves to guarantee

during which the prisoner lacks the legal means to assert his rights. It is precisely under these circumstances that the writ of habeas corpus is of greatest
importance.
Id
Article 27 limits the ability of the state to suspend rights and freedoms by
delineating a category of specific rights and freedoms that are never derogable under
any circumstances. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 17.
136. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 518.
137. Habeas Corpus Case, supra note 26, at 518.
138. ARTHUR HENRY ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2d ed. 1977).
139. Id at 5-16.
140. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 45.
141. European Convention, supra note 17, arts 2-18. See generally LAWSON, supra
note 12, at 564 (discussing the rights protected under the European Social Charter).
All 22 member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the Convention. BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 326 (Ian Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1992). These states
are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San
Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Id
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these rights in "[e]very Member of the Council of Europe," thereby
requiring them to accept the principles and ensure "the enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms."' 42
B. RIGHTS GUARANTEED
The European Convention establishes the most advanced international
system for protecting human rights in existence today." The European
Convention's guarantees include the right to life, the right to be free
from torture, inhumane or degrading treatment and punishment, the
prohibition of slavery, and the rights to liberty, security of person, and
due process of law.' The European Convention also contains a nondiscrimination clause and a provision requiring that member states provide effective remedies for victims of human rights violations.'4
Article 15 of the European Convention establishes two conditions for
derogation: (1) the existence of a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation, and (2) any measures undertaken by the state resulting
from the dangers facing the state.46 In theory, these conditions appear
to restrict a state's right to derogate.'4 In practice, however, the bar-

142. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
143. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Issues In and About the Jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, 40 TUL. L. REV. 21 (1965).

144. European Convention, supra note 17, arts. 2-6.
145. European Convention, supra note 17, arts. 13-14. See generally, FRANCIS G.
JACOBS, TiE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (1975) (discussing the

guarantees made by the parties to the European Convention).
146. European Convention, supra note 17. art. 15.
Article 15 of the European Convention states:
(1) In time of war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take derogations from its obligations under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law.
(2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting
from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1)and 7 shall be
made under this provision.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation
shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the
measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to
operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
Id.

147. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
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riers to derogation in the European system are frighteningly low and
human rights are often suspended.
B.

THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Jurisdiction
Only the parties to the European Convention that accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Com-

mission on Human Rights (the Commission) may refer cases to the
Court.'4 The Commission's jurisdiction to deal with cases filed by one
party against another party becomes compulsory as soon as both parties
have ratified the Convention. 49 The Commission's jurisdiction to decide individual petitions is, however, optional."5 Individual jurisdiction
is invocable only if the party, in addition to ratifying the Convention,
has submitted to individual jurisdiction.'

Only cases that the Commission and the parties refer to the European
Court of Human Rights have contentious jurisdiction.'

Individuals

have no standing to take a case before the Court.'53 Individuals may
only file complaints with the Commission.'5 The Commission may
the Court accepts a case and renders a
refer the case to the Court. After
5
decision, the decision is final.
Although the European Convention initially conferred only contentious
jurisdiction on the European Court," it now also has limited advisory

jurisdiction.'5 The European Convention empowers only the Commit-

148. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
149. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 24.
150. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 24.
151. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 25. An individual must exhaust all
available domestic remedies before filing a case with the Commission. Id. art. 26.
152. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 45.
153. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 44 (stating that only parties
and the Commission have the right to bring actions before the Court). A case is ripe
for adjudication by the court only "[a]fter the Commission has acknowledged the failure of efforts for a friendly settlement and within the period of three months provided for in Article 32." L art. 47.
154. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 25.
155. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 52.
156. See ROBERTSON, supra note 138, at 314-19 (discussing the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights).
157. ROBERTSON, supra note 138, at 314-19. See generally European Convention,
supra note 17, Protocol IT.
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tee of Ministers to request advisory opinions.'" This power is limited,
however, to "legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto."'' In exercising its advisory juris-

diction, the Court may not interpret "the content or scope of the rights
guaranteed by the European Convention and its Protoor freedoms
'' °
c ols . tW

2. Shortcomings in the European System: Past Derogations
The European Commission's record is not encouraging. Nearly forty
percent of the 5,000 registered applications lodged under Article 25 of
the European Convention came from "persons detained in prison, or
otherwise interned."'6

Despite large scale degrading

and barbaric

detentions by Britain in Northern Ireland, the Commission has refused to
investigate the complaints or to take appropriate action.'"

The European Convention is subject to strict, impartial, and
nonpoliticized international supervision by its Commission and by the
European Court." These agencies have interpreted the derogation
clause of the European Convention and found all three of the following
derogations cases justifiable. Lawless v. Ireland'6 originated from an

158. European Convention, supra note 17, Protocol 11, art. 1(1).
159. European Convention, supra note 17, Protocol II, art. 1(1).
160. European Convention, supra note 17, Protocol H, art. 1(2).
161. European Comm'n of Human Rights, Human Rights in Prison, 1 CASE LAW
Topics 1 (1971).
This author contends that statesmen hypocritically proclaim the importance of
the protection of human rights but refuse to act when the need arises. Such hypocrisy
has led to a crisis in the world order. This crisis is apparent by the inability of European and other states to cope with international terrorism as characterized by a
policy of craven surrender to terrorists' threats, and by a failure to punish terrorists
and to intervene against countries knowingly harboring terrorists or acting as accessories after the fact. AL
162. Report of the Lawless Case, supra note 94, at 9; Lawless Case (Lawless v.
Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTs. 430 (Eur. Court of Human Rights)
[hereinafter Lawless Case]; Report of the European Commission on Human Rights
(Ireland v. United Kingdom), 1976-78 E.C.B.R., ser. B. voL 23-L at 8 [hereinafter
Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom]; Ireland v. United Kingdom. 2 E.H.R.R. 25,
1978 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. R''S. 602 (Eur. Court of Human Rights) [hereinafter
Ireland v. United Kingdom].
163. LOTIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHA., INTERNATIONAL PROTEcTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1008 (1973).

164. Report of the Lawless Case, supra note 94, at 9; Lawless Case, 1961 Y.B.
EUR. CoNY. ON HUM. RTs. at 430.
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individual complaint and was examined by the Commission and the
Court. The Greek Case65 originated from a complaint by several other
member states and did not reach the Court. Both the Commission and
the Court examined Ireland v. United Kingdom."
a. Notification

The European Convention requires that derogating parties notify the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe of all derogation measures
taken and of the reasons for the derogation. 67 The European Convention does not, however, contain time limits for such notification.' In
the Greek Case, the Commission found that the state's communication
of the reasons for derogation was unduly late because more than four
months had passed. 69 By contrast, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the American Convention require immediate
notification.'70 This probably means that such notification should occur
no later than at the time the government imposes derogation.
While governments in the European system must give information
concerning the nature of the derogation measures, they need not specify
the derogated articles.' 7 ' Moreover, a violation of the notification requirement does not appear to affect the validity of the derogation.'
By contrast, both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the American Convention require precise information identifying the derogated provisions.'
Therefore, derogations from the European Convention are most likely to suffer from neglect or lack of accountability.

165. The Greek Case, 1968 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. 690 (Eur. Comm'n
on Human Rights) [hereinafter Greek Case]. Greece suspended its constitution following a series of demonstrations, riots, terrorist attacks, and strikes. Id. at 704.
166. Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 162, at 8; Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. at 602.
167. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15(3).
168. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15(3) (failing to delineate any
time constraints on notification of derogation).
169. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. at 41-43.
170. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(3); International Covenant, supra
note 93, art. 4(3).
171. Lawless Case, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. at 482. Governments
must give a specific and timely statement of the reasons for the derogation. Id.
172. Lawless Case, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. at 482-86.
173. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(3); International Covenant, supra
note 17, art. 4(3).
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b. Criteriaof an Emergency
Because certain international conflicts do not clearly constitute public
emergencies, the European Court has given substantial deference to the
judgment of derogating governments."
To justify derogations, the Irish government in Lawless argued that

174. Report of the Lawless Case, supra note 94, at 57. The "margin of appreciation" or scope of discretion of domestic courts is recognized by the Strasbourg authorities as immunizing states from the challenge of the European Convention. Id.; see
also Sir Humphrey's Argument, 2 E.H.R.R.. ser. B, at 391-97 (1960-61) (encouraging
the Court to adopt the concept of "margin of appreciation").
The Lawless Case dealt with Article 15 of the European Convention. Report of
the Lawless Case, supra note 94. The Commission, and later the European Court,
accepted the argument that national authorities should benefit from a reasonable "margin of appreciation" in deciding whether a public emergency exists and in deciding
what measures to take to cope with a public emergency. Id. at 57. The Court later
recognized that the provisions allowing restrictions on some of the basic human rights,
as provided for in paragraph 2 of Articles 8, 9, 10 and II of the Convention, would
leave a margin of appreciation to the contracting states when exercising such restrictions. Id. This margin, according to the Court, is given to both the domestic legislatare and other domestic bodies called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force.
Id.; see, e.g., DeWilde, Ooms and Vevsyp Cases, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) (1971);
Case of Engel and Others, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Colder Case, 18 Eur.
C. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-22 (1975). According to the Court in Ireland v. United Kingdom:
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for
the "life of the nation," to determine whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far is it necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the
pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a
better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of
such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to
avert it. In this matter Article 15(1) leaves those authorities a wide margin of
appreciation.
Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect.
The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of the States' engagements .

. . ,

is empowered to rule on whether the

States have gone beyond the "extent strictly required by the exigencies" of the
crisis ....

Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 162.
Domestic margin of appreciation is thus accompanied by a European supervision. Id; see also Feingold, The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and the European Convention on Human Rights, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 90, 90-106 passim (1977)

(discussing the Court's use of the margin of appreciation and its incompatibility with
the European Convention).
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the warlike operations of the Irish Republican Army against the authorities in Northern Ireland created a state of emergency by attempting to
involve the Irish State in a war against a foreign state.'75 The Court in

Lawless defined a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation"
somewhat vaguely as "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the State is composed."' 76 In
Ireland v. United Kingdom,'7 also involving Northern Ireland, the
United Kingdom argued that shooting, bombing and rioting, the inability
of regular criminal courts to restore peace and order, the widespread
intimidation of the population, and the difficulties for control presented
by the ease of escape across the border, justified the United Kingdom's
derogation from its obligations.' 78
The Ireland Court's analysis is, however, problematic. Because internal disturbances do not involve dangers from outside the state that
threaten the life of the nation, any measure the government takes to
cope with internal emergencies are directed against the citizens of the
state. This is inconsistent with the prescribed purposes of the derogation
clause and the Ireland Court's opinion. Even actual war may not constitute a sufficient threat to justify restrictions on personal freedom. A war,
for example, may take place far from the territory of a country and may
not affect the normal life of a nation. Similarly, mere declarations of
war may not always accompany belligerent acts. As with all other public dangers, if a national government can confront a war with its ordinary powers, it cannot use the war to declare a state of emergency and
to expand those powers.
In the Greek Case, the Commission held that an emergency must
affect the whole nation before a derogation is permitted. 79 In its
report, the Commission attempted to give a general and comprehensive

175. ROBERTSON, supra note 138, at 112-39; Report of the Lawless Case, supra
note 94, at 76.
176. Lawless Case, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTS. at 472-74. The Court
considered critical: (1) the existence of a secret army (the Irish Republican Army) engaged in unconstitutional activities and using violence to reach their ends; (2) the
operation of this army outside state territory, which jeopardized Ireland's relations
with its neighbors; and (3) the steady and alarming increase in terrorist activities. Id.
at 474.
177. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. at 602.
178. Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 162, at 75-86.
179. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. at 72.
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list of requirements for a "public emergency."'" The Commission declared that the crisis: (1) must be actual and imminent; (2) must involve
the whole nation; (3) must threaten the continuance of the organized life
of the community; and (4) must be exceptional in that the normal measures permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety,
health, and order are plainly inadequate. 8' Moreover, the Commission
placed the burden of proof on the government to demonstrate the need
to suspend human rights. "
c. Limitations on the Scope of Suspension and the Extent of Measures
The scope of a derogation must directly relate to the exigency of the
situation.' A rational link must exist between the emergency and the
specific measures employed.' The emergency must appear grave and
involve a threat to the routine procedures in the administration of
law. " Moreover, while the state may possess a certain "margin of appreciation" for determining whether such a situation exists, its determination is not a matter of unilateral discretion.'" The measures of derogation also must not extend more than are "strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation" that have provoked their use." Thus, the
derogation must relate proportionally to the claimed emergency, and the
state must use the least stringent measures available to alleviate the
emergency situation." The government also receives a "margin of appreciation" in assessing the need for implementation of the

180. Id.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id.
183. See Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom. supra note 162, at 118-19 (ex-

plaining how the United Kingdom justified its methods against Northern Ireland by
referring to Article 15 of the European Convention and the security situation).
184. Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 162, at 119.
185. Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 162, at 119.

186. See generally Lawless Case, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CoNV. ON HUM. RTs. 430 (discussing how the state is bound to the principles and jurisdiction of the Convention as
a Contracting Party and, in return, the individual is bound to the jurisdiction of the
state); Greek Case, 1968 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuM. RTS. 690 (discussing how the

Court rejected the claim of the Greek government to invoke a state of emergency
justifying the suspension of certain rights because the emergency did not exist when
first proclaimed, and was not thereafter beyond the normal control of the Greek au-

thorities).
187. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
188. Report of Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 162. at 118-19.
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derogation.' 9 Nonetheless, the state's decision to levy a derogation
must undergo close international scrutiny.' 9
Similar to Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-

ical Rights 91 and Article 27 of the American Convention,'2 Article
15 of the European Convention' 93 permits derogations only where such

measures are not inconsistent with other obligations under international
law.'" The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide additional obli-

gations under international law with which members of the European
Convention must comply.'95
The fact that Article 5 guarantees the right to liberty but does not
guard against arbitrary use of power represents a significant shortcoming
of the European Convention." The European Convention provides a
substantially lower standard of protection than the Universal Declaration,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the American Convention because the word "lawful" qualifies all the limitations to
the right to personal liberty found in Article 5.' 97 The government that
is accused of violating its obligations also determines the lawfulness of

its actions. The European Convention, however, does provide a set of
criteria to guard against arbitrariness. ' 9r To the extent that international
treaties should protect against arbitrary laws, the United Nations' broader
definition of unlawful activities provides a higher standard of protection

than does the European Convention. ' "
189. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. HUM. RTs. at 100.
190. Report of the Lawless Case, supra note 94, at 66.
191. International Covenant, supra note 93, art. 4.
192. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27.
193. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
194. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15 (defining the scope of a
derogation).
195. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.S. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31.
196. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 5.
197. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 5(4) (declaring that anyone
deprived of liberty is entitled to proceedings that will decide the lawfulness of the
detention).
198. See European Convention, supra note 17, arts. 5-7 (imposing standards of
reasonable treatment for the detained individuals).
199. See Schreuer, supra note 20, at 130 (explaining that Article 2(4) of the Unit-
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d. Enforcing Judgments Under Article 54

Article 54 of the European Convention empowers the Committee of
Ministers to ensure the enforcement of judgments of the European
Court.2' To discharge this obligation, the Committee adopted "Rules
Concerning the Application of Article 54 of the European Convention
on Human Rights."'" The Rules provide that upon transmission of a
judgment, the Committee shall include the judgment on its agenda.r
The state in question then must inform the Committee of steps taken to

comply with the judgment. " 3 If the state has not taken any steps to
comply with the judgment, the case is automatically placed on the
Committee's agenda for consideration within the next six months. -'
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
Under the United States Constitution, the Executive Branch negotiates
treaties. 2' To bind the United States, two-thirds of the Senate must
give its advice and consent to ratification.' The United States Senate
has not yet ratified the American Convention. '
The president may, however, bind the United States without the
Senate's consent by executive agreements. 0-" The president may make
international agreements directly with foreign nations.' Like treaties,

these agreements become the law of the land. " The president could,

ed Nations Charter, which details violations of the prohibition on the use of force, is
the preferred standard for human rights conduct by a state).
200. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 54 (mandating the Committee
of Ministers execute the judgment of the Court).
201. Rules Adopted by the Committee of Ministers Concerning the Application of
Article 54 of the European Convention on Human Rights (approved at the 25th Meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, Feb. 1976).
202. kdL at Rule 1.
203. Id.
204. Id. at Rule 2.
205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
206. Id.
207. See Buergenthal, supra note 33, at 132 (listing the OAS members that have
ratified the American Convention; the United States is absent from this list).
208. See generally United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (discussing the
power of the executive branch to make international agreements).
209. See id. at 330 (stating that certain international agreements do not require the
advice and consent of the Senate).
210. Id.
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therefore, independently bind the United States to the American Convention provided that such an agreement was held not to need the advice
and consent of the Senate.211

The constitutionality of a treaty is purely a domestic issue. 2' 2 Even
if the United States Supreme Court declared a treaty unconstitutional,

United States' failure to give effect to the treaty would constitute a
breach of its obligations under international law.213
Article VI of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that all
treaties are the supreme law of the land.2 4 Under this provision, federal statutes and treaties have the same judicial effect.2" 5 Thus, no treaty
provision becomes effective if it conflicts with the United States Constitution.21 6 A conflict arises with respect to Article I of the Constitution,

which prohibits the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus unless it is
necessary to maintain public safety.2 7 Thus, the United States Constitution might sanction suspension of the right to habeas corpus relief
28
under circumstances where the Habeas Corpus decision would not.
Arguably, the United States is not bound by the Habeas Corpus Case

because it has not ratified the American Convention. Further, as an
advisory opinion, the Habeas Corpus Case may not bind any party to

the Convention. It does not follow, however, that the United States

211. Id
212. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 27. The United States has signed, but
not ratified, the Vienna Convention. Id art. 46.
213. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, arts. 27, 46.
214. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
215. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 421 (1920) (holding that a treaty is
invalid if it infringes on the Constitution). See also Banco National de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (confining international relations to the auspices
of the federal government and disallowing state government interpretations); Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 581 (1884) (holding that courts have reviewing power over
treaty provisions); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasizing that
Congress can denounce treaty obligations at any time).
216. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 2 (1957) (holding that neither Congress nor
any other branch of government power is subject to provisions in international agreements that are outside the scope of the Constitution); see also American Convention,
supra note 17, art. 29(b) (containing a clause stating that nothing shall be inapposite
to the American Convention).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (emphasis added); see Act Relating to Habeas Corpus
and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1963)
(authorizing President Lincoln to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil
War).
218. See supra notes 26 and 102-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Habeas Corpus case).
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should disregard the Habeas Corpus decision. The United States has a
moral obligation, as the model democratic state, to applaud and embrace

the Court's holding21 9that the right to habeas corpus is an essential and
nonderogable right.
Moreover, because the structural integrity of the American Convention
mandates that only organs and parties to the treaty may bring suit to
demand observance of the Convention's guarantees, the United States 2is
unable to bring suit to stop ongoing human rights deprivations. D
United States' nonratification of the American Convention reveals an
alarming insensitivity toward the general purposes and underlying philosophy of the OAS system as well as the goals the United States Constitution establishes.22V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The European Court and the United States must confront the issue of
whether prolonged incommunicado detention and the denial of the right
to challenge the lawfulness of detention are ever justified. Detention and
denial of the right to habeas corpus are often preconditions to torture
and violations of the right to life, which are unconditionally
prohibited.' Thus, the suspension of the right to habeas corpus is
never justifiable. No state of emergency, no matter how violent or wide-

219. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21. The Court stated:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more
pernicious consequences was ever invented by the writ of man than that any of
its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of
necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence.
Id (emphasis added).
220. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 61.
221. If former President Carter had succeeded in gaining Senate consent to ratification, the United States would be in a stronger position, morally and politically, to
pursue a vigorous policy vis-a-vis governments with questionable human rights records. Signing the American Convention would provide the United States with another
method of gaining information concerning human rights conditions in other countries
and attitudes of particular governments about conditions. Such information could influence the direction, substance, and interests of United States' human rights foreign
policy.
222. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27(2).
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spread, could ever require the barring of detained persons from contact
with an officer of the judiciary, a lawyer, a doctor, or a family member.
Denying detainees such contact is never "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."
The United States and the European Court should follow the Habeas
Corpus Court's decision and declare that the right to freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention, guarded by the right to habeas corpus, is

a judicially essential guarantee to protect the remaining rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,22 4 the American Convention, and the recent decision of the Habeas Corpus Court all stand

for the proposition that the right of habeas corpus is nonderogable even
in a state of emergency. These international agreements and decisions
present strong evidence of the nonderogability of the right to habeas
225

corpus in a state of emergency under customary international law.
At a minimum, the European Convention and United States Constitution

should guarantee the following: (1) the right in criminal cases to appear

before a judicial officer; (2) the right to challenge the lawfulness of the
detention; and (3) the right to release if the detention is found unlawful.

Anything less fails to adequately express the right to respect the inherent
dignity of the human person.
CONCLUSION

The first steps toward dictatorship are with the gradual suppression
and erosion of individual rights.2 Once this suppression begins, it be-

223. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
224. International Covenant, supra note 93, art. 10(1).
225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987) (characterizing a growing body of international human rights
law as customary international law). United States courts have relied on customary
international law to grant relief. Id. at § 703(c); see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876
(holding that the right to freedom from torture has become part of customary international law, as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). To substantiate
its conclusion, the court traced the evolution of this rule from the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration, and other major international human rights instruments. Id; see also Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
Over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981) (discussing the struggle of domestic
courts to adequately implement redress for human rights violations abroad in the face
of traditional notions of territoriality).
226. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 138, at 84-138 (discussing the conflicts
surrounding the protection of particular rights).
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comes increasingly difficult to bring it to a halt. 227 A democratic society must determine in advance the standards of rights and freedoms that
it must respect. Society must then institute legal mechanisms to ensure
these standards are observed.m A worldwide system of supervision is
necessary to guarantee these rights as the foundation upon which to
guard against all forms of totalitarianism.
If emergency situations must be the point of departure for the international law of human rights, any derogation must be as restrictive as
possible. 9 The purpose of the American Convention, the European
Convention, and the United States Constitution is to protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms.2 Derogation from the right to habeas corpus only leads to the suspension of further rights and freedoms,
and the gradual erosion and eventual destruction of democratic societies.
Civilization cannot survive without the fundamental rights necessary to
maintain the dignity of man. The state is only a creature of man; it
must serve its master and not itself. Where the international community
allows the state to pursue its goals at the expense of its citizens, mankind takes a giant leap backwards.

227. ROBERTSON, supra note 138, at 5.
228. Accepted general mechanisms of human rights enforcement include diplomatic
pressure, moral and political support for the pro-human rights opposition, economic
sanctions and various proportionate unarmed countermeasures.
229. See Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 31(l) (providing that the treaty
language should be interpreted in good faith based upon its ordinary meaning and in
keeping with its ultimate goal).
230. See Carlos G. Bauer, The Observance of Human Rights and the Structure of
the System for Their Protection in the Western Hemisphere, 30 AN. U. L REv. 5, 6
(1981) (analyzing several international legal structures in place for the advancement of
the protection of human rights).

